Safe Drinking Water Policy for Canada - Turning Hindsight into Foresight by Steve E. Hrudey
C.D. Howe Institute
COMMENTARY
Safe Drinking Water Policy 
for Canada –
Turning Hindsight into Foresight
STEVE E. HRUDEY
In this issue...
A decade after the Walkerton and North Battleford outbreaks, Canada
remains out of step with the international leaders in adopting
management systems for assuring safe drinking water.
NO. 323, FEBRUARY 2011
THE WATER SERIESThe Walkerton and North Battleford drinking water outbreaks in 2000 and 2001 highlighted
major inadequacies in Canada’s drinking water system. Yet roughly 10 years later,
notwithstanding the major improvements in a system that was demonstrably inadequate before,
much of Canada remains out of step with the international leaders in adopting management
systems for assuring safe drinking water. 
Drinking water is essential to human health and well-being. Currently, throughout much of the
developed, industrialized world, including most of urbanized Canada, public drinking water
generally poses a negligible health risk to consumers. But the regulation of drinking water in
Canada is generally guided and managed in a fragmented, almost ad hoc, manner that leaves us
vulnerable to future water-quality failures, most likely in smaller systems. The problem is not that
numerical water safety criteria are inadequately stringent; the documented failures have been
caused by an inability to operate water systems effectively, pointing to inadequate competence.
Despite some clear progress in individual provinces, Canada, overall, needs a system that better
promotes and rewards competence among drinking water providers. Under a “know your own
system” water safety plan approach, those assigned to provide drinking water need to be afforded
the training, intellectual support and compensation that is commensurate with their taking
responsibility, through their actions or inactions, for the health of an entire community.
Concurrently, provincial drinking water policies should encourage, where conditions allow
effective results, consolidation of smaller systems into larger more viable operations. Much of
England and Australia now provide small communities' drinking water via large and competent
regional water authorities. 
Canadians should expect that they will be provided safe drinking water in any community, not
just the larger urban areas. This Commentary proposes the universal adoption of a “know your
own system” water safety plan approach in Canada that would be based on a tangible
demonstration of operator competence for understanding and delivering safe drinking water. 
ABOUTTHE INSTITUTE
The C.D. Howe Institute is a leading independent, economic and social policy research institution. The
Institute promotes sound policies in these fields for all Canadians through its research and
communications. Its nationwide activities include regular policy roundtables and presentations by policy
staff in major regional centres, as well as before parliamentary committees. The Institute’s individual and
corporate members are drawn from business, universities and the professions across the country.
INDEPENDENT • REASONED ￿ RELEVANT
THE AUTHOR
OFTHIS ISSUE
STEVE E. HRUDEY is
Professor Emeritus,





Alberta. He served as a
member of the Research
Advisory Panel to the
Walkerton Inquiry and
the Minister’s Expert
Panel on Safe Drinking
Water for First Nations.
Rigorous external review 
of every major policy study,
undertaken by academics 
and outside experts, helps
ensure the quality,
integrity and objectivity 





THE STUDY IN BRIEFCommentary 323 | 1
Independent • Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
A
fter serving on the Research
Advisory Panel to Justice
Dennis O’Connor for the
Walkerton Inquiry, I have been asked
several times, “If the Walkerton disaster
were not enough to motivate Canadians
to manage drinking water safety
effectively, what would it take?”
Because clear deficiencies are still
evident in Canada’s management
structure for assuring safe drinking
water, this critical question remains
unanswered. The following discussion
identifies some major deficiencies in
contrast with current international
best practice for assuring safe
drinking water. 
Drinking water is essential to human health and
well-being. Currently, throughout much of the
developed, industrialized world, including most of
urbanized Canada, public drinking water generally
poses a negligible health risk to consumers. However,
Canadians residing in smaller communities and
remote settings do not have that assurance
(Hrudey 2008). 
In Canada, the management of drinking water
and assurance of safety is not as universally
effective as it can and should be, largely because of
a management structure that is ill-suited to the
task, complacency, some misunderstanding of key
safety issues and an overall lack of leadership. 
The reality that we have not detected major
drinking water outbreaks in Canada since North
Battleford, Sask., in 2001 suggests that we must
be doing something right, a point made by federal
and provincial health officials in response to early
drafts of this Commentary. Technical expertise in
many Canadian water providers is certainly on par
with the best in the world. Most operational
personnel in Canada are dedicated to providing
safe drinking water. Indeed, Ontario, in particular,
and the other provinces to a lesser degree have
instituted major changes and improvements to the
regulation of drinking water in the intervening years.
Notwithstanding the major improvements in a
system that was demonstrably inadequate before
the Walkerton and North Battleford outbreaks, 
I believe much of Canada remains out of step with
the international leaders in adopting management
systems for assuring safe drinking water.
Canadians should ask: why? 
Our current system is structured largely to
download responsibility for safe drinking water to
the lowest level of public authority, municipal
government. In contrast, some jurisdictions like
England and the Australian states of South
Australia, Victoria and Western Australia have
organized drinking water services to be provided
by large, regional water corporations, even for
small communities. 
Post-Walkerton, Canadian provinces now
generally hold municipal authorities more directly
accountable for providing safe drinking water, but
the regulatory system remains generally more
reactive than preventive. It focuses more on
monitoring treated water quality rather than
primarily on training and process monitoring
aimed at ensuring operators know their own
system better. Despite some clear progress in
individual provinces, Canada, overall, needs a
system that better promotes and rewards competence
among drinking water providers. It needs a system
that helps providers understand fully the nature of
the challenge they have been dealt and better
equips them with appropriate and effective support
systems to deliver on their responsibility. 
Ultimately, Canada needs a more consistent 
and comprehensive “know your own system”
approach, such as is promoted by international
best practice requiring water safety plans as a
fundamental management approach. Under an
effective water safety plan approach, those
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assigned to provide drinking water need to be
afforded the training, intellectual support and
compensation that is commensurate with their
taking responsibility, through their actions or
inactions, for the health of an entire community. 
Concurrently, provincial drinking water policies
should encourage, where conditions allow effective
results, consolidation of smaller systems into larger
more viable operations. The relevant test of
viability should be based on a tangible
demonstration of operator competence for
understanding and delivering safe drinking water.
For their part, Ontario regulators argue that the
province has achieved all of these objectives and is
now recognized as a world water safety leader.
That said, there still remains more of a focus on
compliance with complex regulations than there is
encouragement and promotion of knowing one’s
own system, specifically for the smaller systems
with limited resources. 
Water professionals can judge for themselves
whether the critical elements of the water safety
plan approach advocated in this Commentary are
being met in Ontario. However, one critical
element of the water safety plan approach is that it
requires continuous self-assessment and a
commitment to continuous improvement. A
blanket conclusion that everything is now under
control and improvement is not necessary is
wholly inconsistent with that philosophy.
Over the past five years, while giving outbreak
case-study presentations to water operators in
Alberta, Saskatchewan, Ontario and the Atlantic
provinces and speaking directly with many front-
line personnel in British Columbia, I have heard
too many concerns expressed  for me to dismiss
them as irrelevant outliers. Canadians should
expect that they will be provided safe drinking
water in any community, not just the larger 
urban areas. 
The challenge for regulators is to bring these
smaller communities up to a best-practice
standard. A number of small communities persist
in providing the minimum financial compensation
and training support they can get away with. Such
communities are complacent about promoting the
level of competence required for assuring safe
drinking water. The extent of this problem has
been evident in the large number (over 1,700
reported in a national survey in 2008) of ongoing
boil-water advisories in Canada, many of which
have been in place for months or even years
(Eggertson 2008). Boil-water advisories are
intended to be emergency measures to protect
consumers from imminent but temporary threats
to drinking water safety. Long-term continuing or
recurring advisories, regardless of their underlying
rationale, are a frank admission that the affected
systems are otherwise failing to assure safe
drinking water.
Given that Canadian provinces are unlikely to
undertake a massive regulatory and structural
overhaul to relieve municipalities of responsibility
for producing safe drinking water, the
Federal/Provincial/Territorial Committee on
Drinking Water (CDW) provides the only forum
that has the potential to show the necessary
national leadership to improve the current system.
Primarily, the CDW could encourage the meaningful
and universal adoption of the “know your own
system” water safety plan approach in Canada.
Currently, Health Canada, on behalf of the
CDW, believes that its publications (CDW 2001,
CDW/CCME 2002, CDW/CCME 2004,
IWGDW 2005) on implementing a source-to-tap,
multiple-barrier approach are sufficient to assure 
a water safety plan approach. For its part, Ontario
believes it has fully implemented that approach, so
it should be willing to show leadership in
documenting and sharing its experience with
other CDW jurisdictions to achieve national
adoption. Ongoing critical self-examination is
essential for fully implementing the philosophy
underpinning the water safety plan approach
advocated in this Commentary.
Distant Hindsight
Throughout much of human history, the quality
and safety of drinking water has been suspect,
notably where humans have gathered in close
proximity, allowing human wastes to contaminate
drinking water. The ability of drinking water to
transmit disease was only established by scientificCommentary 323 | 3
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evidence in the mid- to late 1800s. Cholera
attracted particular attention at this time because
of its devastating epidemics, such as one in 1849
causing more than 53,000 deaths in England and
Wales – more than 12 percent of all deaths that
year (Morris 1976). English physician John Snow
was the first to publish a rational scientific
hypothesis about how cholera was spread by
sewage-contaminated drinking water (Snow 1849).
Remarkably, Snow was able to develop the
correct explanation of disease causation 33 years
before the bacterial pathogen responsible for
cholera was isolated by a German microbiologist.
Snow’s theory ultimately proved correct because of
his meticulous and exhaustive efforts to challenge
his own findings by disproving alternative
explanations (Vinten-Johansen et al. 2003). 
Understanding the true cause of waterborne
disease allowed for development of effective water
treatment and distribution, mainly by filtration
and disinfection (chlorination). The resulting
public health benefits have been enormous. Cutler
and Miller (2004) estimate that in the early 20
th
century clean water was responsible for nearly half
of the total mortality reduction, three-quarters of
the infant mortality reduction and nearly two-thirds
of the child mortality reduction observed in major
US cities. 
This remarkable advance was only achieved
because the underlying causes of the problem were
understood and accepted thereby allowing focused
measures to be developed to deal with the root
cause – pathogens in human fecal wastes
contaminating drinking water supplies. Based on
an accurate understanding of the problem, effective
measures to reduce fecal contamination and to
treat and disinfect drinking water were implemented.
Modern History of Unsafe Drinking Water in
Developed, Industrialized Countries
1
The foregoing advances have not been achieved
universally, with much of the world still exposed
to unsafe drinking water (Appendix A). That
reality should serve as a constant reminder that the
primary causes of unsafe water (microbial
pathogens) are a pervasive threat to drinking water
safety. As a consequence of participating on the
Research Advisory Panel to the Walkerton Inquiry,
I initiated a review of recent waterborne disease
outbreaks in developed countries that was later
published as a book (Hrudey and Hrudey 2004).
Ultimately, we presented over 70 case studies of
outbreaks since 1974 from 15 different affluent
nations. These included seven outbreaks where
fatalities arose, causing a total of 24 deaths during
or shortly after the outbreak, and the Milwaukee
outbreak that was followed by an estimated 50
deaths over two years. These findings are summarized
in Appendix B, Table B1, which also includes two
more recent fatal outbreaks – Nokia, Finland, in
2007, and Alamosa, Colorado, in 2008. 
I discuss the Canadian outbreaks below, as well
as summarizing some US cases, in Box 1. The
latter are particularly relevant to Canada because
the United States suffers from the same structural
flaw of placing responsibility for drinking water
upon municipalities. Despite having the most
detailed and onerous regulatory regime for drinking
water in the world, the US accounted for 23 of
the 70 disease outbreak case studies mentioned
above. Canada, with a population just 10 percent
that of the United States, provided half as many of
the case studies (12). For its part, England, with a
population 60 percent larger than Canada’s,
provided only eight case studies. 
Schuster et al. (2005) reported that a total of 99
waterborne disease outbreaks occurred in Canada
over a similar period (1974-2001). Taken together
with the fact that Canada had over 1,700 boil-water
advisories in place in March 2008 (Eggertson
2008) as the last line of defense to protect
consumers, Canada clearly has a tangible water
safety issue, at least in smaller communities, long
after Walkerton.
Recent Canadian History Regarding Unsafe
Drinking Water
In modern history, Canada has been fortunate to
have experienced few fatal drinking water disease
outbreaks. The case studies outlined below include
1 Interested readers should read Appendix A for a summary of the challenges in developing countries. | 4 Commentary 323
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only two outbreaks with fatalities – Drumheller,
Alberta, and Walkerton, Ontario – and one with
considerable notoriety – North Battleford,
Saskatchewan, happening as it did only 11
months after Walkerton. Finally, Kashechewan,
Ont., is included, even though it was not a
drinking water outbreak, because of its
implications for drinking water policy in Canada.
Drumheller, Alberta
In 1983, Drumheller, a town of about 6,500
people, experienced a short but intense outbreak
of gastroenteritis, most likely viral, infecting about
3,000 people and causing two deaths of
vulnerable nursing home patients. The outbreak
was caused by a spill of raw sewage upstream of
the town’s drinking water intake. The sewage
overflows were later determined to be common at
this location during heavy storm flow conditions,
but the sewage spill on this occasion occurred
because of a pump failure. 
The contamination potential was certainly
foreseeable through a risk assessment that would
be part of a water safety plan. Even though the
town operated both the sewage pump station and
the drinking water treatment plants, no notice of
the incident was provided to the water plant
operators, precluding any chance of implementing
additional drinking water treatment measures.
Likewise, a precautionary boil-water advisory
might have been issued if the sewage spill had
been reported and understood. As it happened,
the boil-water advisory was issued almost five days
after the first signs of illness. 
Walkerton, Ontario
The May 2000 outbreak in Walkerton, a town of
4,800 residents at the time, is estimated to have
caused over 2,300 cases of gastroenteritis. Sixty-
five patients were hospitalized, 27 developed
haemolytic uremic syndrome (a severe kidney
condition) and seven died. This disaster attracted
intense national media attention and Walkerton
became a Canadian icon for contaminated water. 
The media attention contributed in part to
widespread misunderstanding among Canadians
about what really went wrong in Walkerton. The
outbreak involved a litany of failures by the actors
involved, ranging from the operators and managers,
to the provincial regulator and the Government of
Ontario (O’Connor 2002a). The media focused
mainly on the misdeeds of the manager and
operators, along with various political accountability
and responsibility controversies related to the
provincial government at the time. While the
popular media issues were relevant, they masked
the underlying complacency and lack of
operational and regulatory competence for the
entire system.
The outbreak was the result of a shallow well
being contaminated by cattle manure following
heavy spring rainfall and widespread flooding.
The well had been identified as vulnerable to
agricultural contamination by the hydrogeologist
who installed it in 1978. His warnings were not
fully heeded, and over the years adverse
microbiological monitoring results had been
largely ignored by operators and regulators alike.
These failures in regulatory oversight occurred
over 22 years and involved provincial governments
of every major political party, somewhat
invalidating many of the simplistic accusations
after the outbreak based on political considerations.
In fact, the water operators were inadequately
trained to recognize the risks or the need for
adequate chlorination. In particular, they were
oblivious to the compelling need for disinfection
and for monitoring chlorine residual as a real-time
measure of disinfection performance for
susceptible pathogens (Hrudey and Walker 2005).
That failure was a key opportunity missed for
preventing this outbreak, despite all the other
deficiencies (O’Connor 2002a). Ultimately, failing
to ensure a reasonable level of competence on the
part of both the operators and the regulators was
the key causative factor in allowing the Walkerton
tragedy to occur.
North Battleford, Saskatchewan
North Battleford is a rural, agricultural service
community which had a population of about
15,000 in 2001 when it experienced an outbreak
of cryptosporidiosis affecting an estimated 5,800
to 7,000 people (Stirling et al. 2001). ThisCommentary 323 | 5
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outbreak was noteworthy, not just because of its
size, but because it happened less than 11 months
after the Walkerton outbreak with all of its
massive media coverage. The North Battleford
water treatment plant intake was located three
kilometres downstream from the city’s sewage
treatment outfall. This proximity represented a
chronic risk, and the outbreak occurred because
the operators performed a maintenance operation
on the water treatment plant in an ineffective
manner that left the plant vulnerable. The chronic
sewage contamination risk had been recognized by
the provincial regulator and the city for almost 40
years without being resolved (Laing 2002). 
After Walkerton, the North Battleford plant’s
foreman took early retirement in December 2000,
citing job stress as a factor. Afterwards, the water
treatment plants were operated by less experienced
operators who initiated the maintenance in late
March 2001 that resulted in negligible fine
particle removal, leaving chlorination as the only
barrier to microbial pathogens. As in Milwaukee
(see Box 1 ), chlorination is not effective against
Cryptosporidium, which allowed this outbreak to
occur. Likewise, despite attempts by the City to
blame the contamination on agricultural runoff
upstream, molecular typing of stool samples from
victims by the B.C. Centre for Disease Control
documented that the human-only strain had
infected all of the individuals providing useable
samples, thereby establishing a sewage source for
the contamination (Hrudey and Hrudey 2004).
Although there were several parallels between
the North Battleford and Walkerton outbreaks,
there were also some key differences. In North
Battleford, some level of water treatment was
being provided and the operators had better
training and awareness of water treatment and
safety issues. They knew enough to have been
pressuring management for water treatment
improvements even though they were unaware of
the public health risk of relying solely on
chlorination for a water supply that was vulnerable
to Cryptosporidium contamination. The
commissioner of the public inquiry into the
outbreak summed up the city’s role by stating: 
“There was a systematic failure on the part of the
City of North Battleford to recognize its
responsibility to produce safe drinking water. This
failure was brought about by the city’s collective
lack of knowledge on what it takes to produce safe
drinking water and policies that discouraged the
possibility that it might acquire such knowledge.”
(Laing 2002).
Kashechewan, Ontario
Kashechewan is a remote Aboriginal reserve in
northern Ontario on the shores of James Bay with
a population of approximately 1,700. Unlike the
foregoing case studies, there was no waterborne
disease outbreak in this community, but media
reports in October 2005 described a major water
safety crisis that left many people believing that an
outbreak had occurred. The circumstances
regarding what happened in Kashechewan and the
political response to these events highlight that
even water safety decisions made at the highest
levels of government (the Ontario premier and
prime minister in 2005) may have little to do with
scientific evidence and a lot to do with ill-informed
perception and political expediency. 
A water sample taken in Kashechewan on
October 12, 2005 by Health Canada detected
Escherichia coli (E. coli), a species of bacteria
normally found in the intestinal tract of humans
and warm-blooded animals where it helps digest
food. Most strains of E. coli are harmless, but a
few can cause human disease and are recognized as
pathogens, the best known of these being E. coli
O157:H7, responsible for illness and deaths in the
Cabool, Saitama, Washington County and
Walkerton outbreaks (Appendix B, Table B1). 
The critical misunderstanding in the public
discourse over Kashechewan was confusion
between normal, harmless E. coli and the
pathogenic E. coli O157:H7. 
The normal, harmless and exceedingly more
common E. coli is used as an indicator organism
of possible fecal pollution of water because it is
excreted in huge numbers – 100 billion to 10
trillion per day – in human and animal feces.
When disinfection by chlorine is functional, there
should be no E. coli found in drinking water
because chlorination is extremely effective at| 6 Commentary 323
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Cabool, Missouri – 1989
In 1989, Cabool was a town of about 2,100 people that experienced 243 confirmed cases of infection by
Escherichia coli (E. coli ) O157:H7, including four deaths. The outbreak was apparently caused by sewage
contamination of drinking water during water main repairs following unusually cold weather. The specific
location of contamination was not found, but the distribution system was in poor repair and clearly vulnerable to
sewage contamination. The sewer system was in worse condition, experiencing regular back-ups and overflows.
The deep groundwater drinking water source was free of any indication of microbial pathogen contamination,
but it was distributed without disinfection. The combination of poorly maintained infrastructure, lack of
drinking water treatment (disinfection) or monitoring capacity and unusual weather events resulted in the upset
conditions leading to this fatal outbreak.
Milwaukee, Wisconsin – 1993
In 1993, Milwaukee experienced an enormous outbreak of cryptosporidiosis – as many as 400,000 cases. At the
time, Milwaukee had 600,000 people within a metropolitan region of about 1.6 million, which was served by
two water treatment plants. These plants were practising what was accepted as full conventional water treatment
and were meeting treated water quality standards. Years after the outbreak, archived stool samples revealed a strain
of Cryptosporidium that only infects human, making sanitary sewage discharge from Milwaukee the most likely
source of contamination. While Milwaukee had an adequate water treatment system to cope with bacterial raw
water contamination, Cryptosporidium, being chlorine resistant, demands optimum filtration performance, as
measured by maximum turbidity removal and additional disinfection capable of handling the chlorine-resistant
pathogen. Milwaukee had not implemented recommendations on how to avoid cryptosporidium outbreaks and
operating personnel failed to respond to both a turbidity spike in filtered water and a sharp rise in consumer
phone complaints that in retrospect signaled the contamination episode.
Gideon, Missouri – 1993
Gideon in 1993 was a town of about 1,100 when a drinking water outbreak made more than half the population ill
and caused seven deaths. Like Cabool, Gideon had a high-quality groundwater supply feeding into a poorly
maintained distribution system without disinfection. The specific cause of the outbreak of salmonellosis was not
clearly identified, but it was most likely caused by poor maintenance of water storage facilities. One tank was found
to have fecal contamination from birds. The outbreak investigation inferred that the contaminated water was
washed into the distribution system during an effort to flush it because of consumer water quality complaints
about odour.
Alamosa, Colorado – 2008 
Almosa, a community of about 9,000 people in 2008, experienced a drinking water outbreak of salmonellosis
causing an estimated 1,300 cases of illness and one death, precipitating a state declared emergency. The
groundwater system, which was not chlorinated, became contaminated with pathogenic salmonella, most likely
because of a poorly maintained surface storage tank that became contaminated by feces from small animals or
birds.
These fatal outbreaks, with the exception of Milwaukee, all occurred in smaller communities and could have been
prevented if chlorination had been required. Meanwhile, chlorination was supposed to have been in place in
Walkerton, but was not maintained because the operators failed to measure chlorine residual that would have told
them in real time about the failure of chlorine disinfection (Hrudey and Walker 2005). In Milwaukee, the failure
was inadequate filtration performance because of an inability to understand the risk posed by chlorine-resistant
Cryptosporidium, similar to the failure in North Battleford eight years later. These case studies illustrate a failure to
learn from experience.
Box 1: Fatal US Drinking Water Outbreaks over the Past 20 YearsCommentary 323 | 7
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inactivating all enteric bacteria, including both
normal and pathogenic strains of E. coli.
Confirmed detection of E. coli in treated drinking
water is indicative of inadequate disinfection and
some fecal contamination, which raises the
possibility of a health risk. 
The presence of the indicator E. coli is a
warning that must be dealt with. However,
detection of E. coli in treated drinking water does
not make it certain, nor even necessarily likely
that the water is contaminated with pathogen
numbers sufficient to cause disease. The normal
response is to issue a boil-water advisory and to
investigate and fix the problem. In the case of
Kashechewan, it had already been on a boil-water
advisory for over two years because of elevated
turbidity, a signal that its filtration treatment was
not as effective as it should have been.
The band council was immediately informed,
technical specialists were contracted and a plane
was chartered to fly the technicians into
Kashechewan. They located the problem – a
malfunctioning chlorinator – and fixed it in a few
hours. Water samples reported on October 17
showed the treated water to be free of E. coli.
Chlorination was increased for two or three days
to assure that the water distribution system would
be free of E. coli before returning to normal
chlorine residual levels. Throughout the episode,
Ontario’s guidance for maximum chlorine residual
concentration was never exceeded. 
The incident began receiving increasing
national media attention with reports of the 
E. coli detection, which drew no distinction with
the notorious E. coli O157:H7 pathogen of
Walkerton infamy. On October 25, a physician
from a regional hospital met with the Premier of
Ontario and showed him distressing photos of
infants with severe skin rashes that were claimed
to be worsened by the high chlorine levels in the
drinking water. 
The Premier announced an evacuation – to be
paid for by the federal government – which would
over the next few weeks remove about 60 percent
of Kashechewan’s 1,700 residents to various
Ontario communities. The federal government
then reacted to show that it was responding to the
“crisis” by sending Kashechewan a Hercules
military transport plane with an emergency field
water treatment plant to supplement massive
bottled water shipments that had started shortly
after the initial E. coli results were reported. The
sobering reality is that there was no disease caused
by E. coli-contaminated water in Kashechewan. 
The skin rashes were real, but were caused by
scabies and impetigo, skin conditions well known
to be caused by poor sanitation and over-crowded,
sub-standard living conditions. Suggestions that
high chlorine levels were exacerbating the rash
problem were unfounded and in any case did not
justify a community-wide evacuation. (Notably,
Australia has found chlorinated swimming pools
to be effective at reducing the prevalence of skin
rashes among Aboriginal children in remote
communities [Lehmann et al. 2003, Audera et al.
1999].)
Kashechewan’s extraordinary series of events was
driven by many factors beyond the reporting of 
E. coli in the drinking water, including the
deplorable housing and social conditions in this
community with 85 percent unemployment.
However, the costs, which surely reached into the
tens of millions of dollars for the evacuation and
other extraordinary measures taken, most of
which were not justifiable on the grounds of
health protection, would clearly have been better
invested in measures to improve the community’s
underlying problems. In any case, the obvious
disconnect between the knowledge of what the
detection of indicator E. coli means versus the
government responses, as if it were dealing with a
continuing and urgent health threat, reveals a
government inability to respond accurately to
drinking water safety issues in 2005, even after the
Walkerton trauma five years earlier. Now, another
six years later, there is only limited evidence that
the Kashechewan debacle could not be repeated.
Seeking to Turn Hindsight into Foresight
We should be able implement improved programs
and procedures based on our experience with
waterborne disease. While there have been
substantial international advances in institutionalized| 8 Commentary 323
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management of the most critical elements for
assuring safe drinking water, considerably less
advancement is evident across Canada even after
the wake-up call from Walkerton. In my
experience, the mistakes of Walkerton have
attracted more interest and inspired more
enlightened foresight among some water providers
and regulators outside of Canada than within. 
Responses for Assuring Safe Drinking Water in
Other Jurisdictions
In the past decade, an international consensus has
developed around the need to focus more on
operational competence rather than relying on a
narrow and somewhat naive focus on compliance
with numerical water quality criteria. The latter
approach is naive because there are very few water
quality parameters (e.g., turbidity, chlorine
residual, pH, conductivity, UV absorbance) that
can be measured continuously or in real time.
Consequently, compliance monitoring with
individual drinking water guideline numbers
means that water is likely to have already been
consumed by the time laboratory results become
available, providing an inherently reactive, rather
than a preventive system (IWA 2004). Likewise,
most of the numerical guideline values involve
expensive analyses (some costing hundreds of
dollars per sample) that are generally performed as
infrequently as once or twice a year, if at all,
making the coverage of compliance monitoring
extremely limited.
At this point, it is useful to consider two
jurisdictions that have made considerable progress
in developing an effective water safety plan approach. 
New Zealand
With its introduction in 2000 of public health
risk management plans (PHRMP), New Zealand
developed a pragmatic and effective program to
support a competency-based safe water program.
The PHRMP approach, supported by a number
of background documents and guides available at
the New Zealand Ministry of Health website,
http://www.moh.govt.nz/water, follows a very
logical assessment of a drinking water system that
has universal application. 
Under the PHRMP approach, a water supply
system is first assessed to identify which of several
water safety guides may be applicable. A checklist
of the barriers against contamination in the
system is developed. These barriers fall into four
categories that, if maintained effectively, will
adequately control hazards (Nokes and Taylor
2003). They are:
￿ prevention of contaminants entering the raw water
of the supply;
￿ removal of particles from the water;
￿ inactivation of microorganisms in the water; and,
￿ maintenance of water quality during distribution.
The applicable guides are used to identify
events which may pose a threat to water safety,
then to identify possible causes of each hazardous
event, preventive or protective measures that can
be taken and, finally, corrective actions to take
should the preventive measures fail. From this
overview assessment, decisions are made regarding
improvements that are needed, the order of
priority for improvements and a timetable for
implementation. Contingency plans are prepared
and an overall performance assessment is performed
to judge how well the PHRMP is performing. 
The PHRMP approach is now enshrined as a
requirement in New Zealand’s safe drinking water
legislation for all systems supplying a population
of more than 500 people (NZMOH 2008).
Smaller systems can also use the PHRMP
approach because it has been designed particularly
to support and guide smaller systems.
Australia
Australia experienced a water-quality crisis in
Sydney in 1998, two years before hosting the
summer Olympics. This event had three million
residents on and off a boil-water advisory from
late July through September. The event was most
likely the result of a monitoring mistake whose
impact was quickly compounded by overwhelming
media criticism and political reaction (Hrudey
and Hrudey 2004). Health surveillance
demonstrated that there was no evidence ofCommentary 323 | 9
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waterborne illness, but the subsequent inquiry led
to the firing of several senior officials and the
breaking up of the water company supplying 
the city. 
The events and resulting fallout, along with a
number of other changes in the structure of
Australia’s water industry that were underway, set
the stage for the development and adoption of a
comprehensive new approach for drinking water
quality and safety based on widely accepted Total
Quality Management (TQM) principles (Sinclair
and Rizak 2002; Rizak et al. 2003). 
A key feature of the resulting Framework for the
Management of Drinking Water Quality was to
shift the primary focus from drinking-water
guidelines based on numerical water quality
criteria to an emphasis on achieving optimum
performance of the processes known to produce
high-quality, safe drinking water. The Australian
Drinking Water Guidelines (ADWG) were
substantially restructured to introduce this
Framework as the overall organizing concept.
(NHMRC 2004). For a further discussion on
other international approaches to safe drinking
water, see Box 2. 
Canadian Responses
Over the past decade, the discourse on drinking
water in Canada has largely been shaped by
Walkerton, as might be expected. Given what
happened there, and the reality that the conditions
leading to the disaster existed to varying degrees
elsewhere in Canada, there was a need for a
mature national discussion about drinking water
safety. Unfortunately, other than the attention
given by the Walkerton Inquiry to international
practices and approaches for ensuring safe drinking
water, many provincial drinking water programs
have generally continued to focus on US
regulatory practices and have not explicitly
adopted the international movement toward a
water safety plan approach.
Walkerton Inquiry and the Ontario Safe
Drinking Water Act
The Walkerton Inquiry produced two reports.
Part 1 dealt with the causes of the outbreak,
including the role of the Ontario government
(O’Connor, 2002a). Part 2 proposed a strategy to
avoid such a disaster happening again (O’Connor,
2002b). The Part 2 report made 93 recommendations
to implement a multiple-barrier approach to
drinking water protection across Ontario, with
particular attention on:
￿ improved coordination of source protection; 
￿ improved standards-setting with greater
transparency; 
￿ improved provincial oversight, including
regulatory obligations under comprehensive
legislation to manage water quality from source to
tap; and 
￿ special considerations for small systems. 
The province accepted all the recommendations,
making more comprehensive efforts to focus on
source water protection than in other Canadian
jurisdictions. The most important recommendations
related to assuring competence have taken the
longest to implement. Justice O’Connor described
these as follows: 
“Perhaps the most significant recommendations in
this report address the need for quality management
through mandatory accreditation and operational
planning. Sound management and operational
systems help prevent, not simply react to, the
contamination of drinking water. Also, as part of
the quality management approach, I recommend
that each municipality be required to have an
operational plan for its water system.”
The emphasis of Justice O’Connor’s findings on
promoting and sharing competence seems clear
enough, but the roll-out of the Ontario Safe
Drinking Water Act and enforcement of new
regulatory provisions have added complexity
without creating an adequate support system that
can effectively foster competence, especially in
smaller communities. The new regulatory scheme,
which is detailed and complex, appears more| 10 Commentary 323
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World Health Organization
The 2004 World Health Organization revised water guidelines provide a broader perspective on safe drinking
water with a primary emphasis on better knowing one’s system (WHO 2004b). The WHO guidelines are based
on a water safety plan approach that builds upon the New Zealand PHRMP concept and some of the broader
quality and risk management features of the ADWG. Essentially, this approach aims to insure that all those who
are engaged in operating a drinking water system will fully understand:
￿ the threats the system faces; 
￿ the capability of the system to deal with those threats; 
￿ the capabilities to respond if the system fails; and 
￿ the measures that can be used to improve the capability of the system to assure that it can deliver safe drinking
water (Bartram et al. 2009). 
Bonn Charter
In 2004, with the support of the International Water Association and WHO, water organizations from several
countries and regions – Australia (2), Europe, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the
United States (3) – negotiated a framework of institutional, managerial and operational requirements for assuring
safe drinking water (IWA 2004). These included key principles for managing drinking water effectively and
described the roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders. Notably, no organization from Canada
participated in this initiative. The Bonn Charter emphasizes an integrated approach to the effective management
of drinking water. Subsequently, the IWA has sponsored the Bonn Network (IWA 2007) that recruited 15 water
authorities from 12 countries to develop tools for assuring safe drinking water. No Canadian water provider
accepted an invitation to participate. 
England – Badenoch Expert Reports and Drinking Water Inspectorate
Drinking water delivery in England experienced a major restructuring in the 1980s with the privatization of the
public water authorities responsible for drinking water and municipal wastewater treatment. A subsequent series
of cryptosporidiosis outbreaks, most notably in Swindon and Oxfordshire (Hrudey and Hrudey 2004), drew
immediate attention to the issue of water system safety. An expert inquiry was undertaken to find out the causes
and necessary preventive measures (Badenoch et al. 1990, 1995). The reports produced by the Badenoch inquiry
yielded extensive technical advice which, if it had been widely heeded, would have likely prevented outbreaks like
the one in Milwaukee in 1993. A new regulator, the Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI) was formed in 1990 to
assure that these newly created private water authorities provided high quality, safe water. The DWI is a small
regulatory agency for England and Wales with only 38 employees, but it has been relatively effective in assuring
that the drinking water industry meets high quality and safety standards. In particular, the DWI has adopted the
water safety plan approach as a central element of its regulatory scheme.
United States and the European Union
These jurisdictions have many different agencies, programs and approaches some of which have resulted in
excellent advances in drinking water quality technology and practice. For example, water authorities in France,
Germany and the Netherlands are recognized as world leaders in many aspects of safe drinking water supply.
However, the European Union had been following a numbers-oriented regulatory scheme similar to the US
Environmental Protection Agency. Since the 2004 release of the WHO guidelines, individual European Union
members (e.g., Britain, Germany, Portugal) have strongly embraced the water safety plan approach. 
The US regulatory system has developed some of the best technical information for assuring safe drinking water.
However, the US emphasis on compliance with drinking water quality standards has too often overshadowed
some excellent initiatives that focus on operational excellence through treatment requirements, peer review and 
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focused on providing authority for legal
enforcement than on building a system that
ensures operational competence and fosters
knowledge transfer from the best operators to
those who need to improve. An important
exception has been the creation and Ontario
support for the excellent training programs of the
Walkerton Clean Water Centre
(http://www.wcwc.ca/en/)
North Battleford Inquiry
The report from the North Battleford outbreak
inquiry (Laing 2002) provides an excellent insight
into the problems of providing water and
sanitation services in a rural community where
safe drinking water was clearly not a priority.
Although some of the indifference to public
health among local politicians and civic
administration may seem exceptional, such
occurrences are too common where responsibility
for providing water is downloaded to the
municipal level without an adequate supporting
framework. This is particularly true for smaller
municipalities where, unless very effective
provincial oversight and support is provided, a
knowledge-oriented, competence-based
operational approach is unlikely to develop
spontaneously and flourish. Recent experience in
Germany with promoting a water safety plan
approach has revealed that smaller communities
need to have this approach required by regulation
to allow it to compete for limited resources with
other local priorities (Schmoll and Castell-Exner
2010).
Watertight: The Case for Change in
Ontario’s Water and Wastewater Sector 
Following the reports from the Walkerton Inquiry
and passage of the Ontario Safe Drinking Water
Act, an expert panel was commissioned to explore
the sustainability of the province’s water and
wastewater infrastructure. The panel report,
known as the Watertight report (Swain et al.
2005), found that Ontario’s current water and
wastewater system was not sustainable because of
inadequate past and current investment while
future costs were escalating, in part because of
more than $800 million in additional capital costs
resulting from Safe Drinking Water Act
requirements. The panel’s recommendations were
clear and well-founded and indicated that
economies of scale were necessary, meaning that
the scale and capacity of systems must increase
generally through regional consolidation. 
There are some examples of successful
regionalization in Alberta, Ontario and Nova
Scotia. Alberta, for one, has pursued
regionalization through investment in treated
water pipelines from larger centres to serve smaller
communities. This approach has improved
drinking water quality in many cases, but does not
address the need for competence in maintaining
local distribution systems. Distribution system
failures have been responsible for at least four fatal
outbreaks in the past 20 years (Appendix B, Table
B1). The Watertight report findings were not
prescriptive about how consolidation should
happen, recognizing that different circumstances
may dictate different approaches. However, it
found a clear economic case for larger, more
support. These initiatives include QualServe, the International Water Treatment Alliance (IWTA), the 
Partnership for Safe Water sponsored by the American Water Works Association (AWWA 2010) and the US
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Area Wide Optimization (AWOP) Program that has been adopted by
four US EPA regions and 21 states. Nova Scotia adopted IWTA standards, a peer review program for promoting
good practice in piloting the treatment component of its drinking water strategy. AWOP is a strategy for targeting
higher risk systems for state assistance to maximize public health protection with a focus on optimization of
treatment performance, including enhanced operator training (US EPA 2003). | 12 Commentary 323
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efficient systems with the obvious corresponding
benefits of being more competent and better run.
This report also made a case for keeping regulations
“lighthanded” to allow the emphasis to be on
achieving and demonstrating competence. 
Unfortunately, Watertight was met with
opposition from some municipalities and public
sector unions. Despite the recent introduction of
the Water Opportunities Act in Ontario, which
proposes to require regulated water providers to
develop a sustainability plan to address some of
the earlier identified problems, there is as yet little
evidence of progress toward encouraging
consolidation of water providers to achieve necessary
economies of scale and functional competence.
Expert Panel on Safe Drinking Water for
First Nations
In September 2005, before the Kashechewan
episode, the federal Commissioner of the
Environment and Sustainable Development tabled
her annual report in Parliament, which  included a
critique of Canada’s $600 million investment
program for water infrastructure on First Nations
reserves. Among her concerns was the absence of
any regulatory regime for assuring safe drinking
water on these reserves. 
I participated as one of a three-member expert
panel, which conducted public meetings in all
regions of Canada on the need for a regulatory
water regime and reported on the regulatory
options to the Minister of Indian and Northern
Affairs. Our panel was specifically barred from
making recommendations. However, we stressed
that implementing any regulatory regime in
circumstances where the capacity to perform was
lacking or limited would be unlikely to improve
drinking water safety (Swain et al. 2006). 
Given 85 percent unemployment at
Kashechewan, the panel’s observation of
difficulties in funding the operation of facilities on
remote reserves, particularly when external
personnel were used, is sadly ironic. The serious
disconnect between having high local
unemployment while needing to use expensive
external personnel suggests that increasing
investment in capital facilities without investing in
better ways to improve local recruitment and
training for operators fails to resolve water safety
issues in a sustainable way. 
We heard from consultants experienced with
small community water systems at our public
hearings, for example, that given the choice
between a gold-plated water treatment plant with
an inadequate operator and a limited water
treatment plant with a highly competent operator,
the latter would be the best choice for safe
drinking water. However, the existing funding
regime places a clear emphasis on infrastructure
with inadequate attention paid to the importance
of commitment by well-trained personnel to
assuring water safety.
An extremely valuable initiative we learned of
during our public hearings is the circuit-rider
system first developed in Saskatchewan for First
Nations water operators and now adopted in most
administrative regions for First Nations of
Canada. This program entails developing a cohort
of skilled operators who travel on a scheduled
basis to visit individual water treatment plants,
including remote facilities to provide hands-on
training and operator support. Unfortunately,
these programs are generally over-subscribed and
underfunded.
Other Provincial Responses
In the years following Walkerton, almost every
province or territory outside Ontario published
some policy statement or took a legislative
initiative to address public drinking water safety
concerns.
2
2 Including B.C. (Government of B.C. 2002), Alberta (Alberta Environment 2003), Saskatchewan (Government of Saskatchewan 2003),
Manitoba (Government of Manitoba 2003 ), Quebec (Government of Québec 2002), Nova Scotia (Government of Nova Scotia 2002),
Prince Edward Island (Government of Prince Edward Island 2001), Newfoundland (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador 2001),
Northwest Territory (Government of the Northwest Territories 2001, 2005) and Yukon Territory (Government of the Yukon 2005).Commentary 323 | 13
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3 “The CDW is a well-established national committee that has been active for more than 20 years. Health Canada provides scientific and
technical expertise to the Committee, and coordinates its activities. The CDW reports to the Federal-Provincial-Territorial Committee on
Health and the Environment (CHE). CHE, in turn, reports on health issues to the Advisory Committee on Population Health and Health
Security (ACPHHS) and on environmental issues to the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment.” 
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ewh-semt/water-eau/drink-potab/fpt/index-eng.php 
4 “The main responsibility of the Federal-Provincial-Territorial Committee on Drinking Water (CDW) is to establish the Guidelines for
Canadian Drinking Water Quality.” Ibid.
These public documents and associated
programs generally reflect the valuable source-to-
tap, multiple-barrier concept for assuring safe
drinking water that was adopted by the Walkerton
Inquiry (O’Connor 2002b). However, the depth
of practical commitment and guidance provided
varies from brief glossy brochures to more in-
depth summaries of potential valuable and
tangible improvements. While there has been a
major improvement in public access to
information on drinking water quality in most
jurisdictions, overall there remains considerable
variability in regulatory regimes (Willms and Shier
2006, Carter 2008), much more than might be
justified on grounds of regional variations. 
British Columbia likely provides the best
documented evidence for the scope of challenges
with assuring safe drinking water for smaller
communities. Growing expressions of concern
about the occurrence of numerous and ongoing
boil-water advisories precipitated an investigation
by the B.C. Ombudsman (Carter 2008). The
subsequent report documented that the number
of small drinking water systems to be regulated
under the province’s Drinking Water Protection Act
was not accurately known, with estimates ranging
between 3,000 and 4,360 systems serving between
2 connections and 300. 
Looking Backwards about Safe
Drinking Water
The Drinking Water Regulatory Reality in Canada
The current Canadian regulatory system for
drinking water is largely dictated by our
constitutional division of powers, which has
historically seen the provinces take responsibility
for regulating municipal services such as drinking
water. While this clearly has merit for a country as
large and diverse as Canada, the particular
characteristics of drinking water safety as a policy
issue lead to some problems with assigning
responsibility to municipalities.
The Federal/Provincial/Territorial Committee
on Drinking Water (CDW), supported and
coordinated by a secretariat within Health
Canada,
3 provides a valuable level of national
coordination, but the CDW focus is primarily on
setting the Guidelines for Canadian Drinking
Water Quality (GCDWQ).
4 These are a list of
essential numerical water quality values, generally
set as maximum acceptable concentrations (MAC)
for chemical, physical and biological parameters
affecting the quality, including aesthetic factors,
and safety of drinking water. 
In addition to the guidance documents on the
multi-barrier approach mentioned earlier, there
has been some guidance published by the CDW
on operational performance for corrosion control
(CDW 2009a) and on issuing and rescinding boil-
water advisories (CDW 2009b, c). Provision of
such guidance is a positive departure from the
previous focus on publishing MAC tables and
documents to support MAC-derivation.
The problem is that, unlike the World Health
Organization Drinking Water Guidelines (WHO
2004b) or Australian Drinking Water Guidelines
(NHMRC 2004), the GCDWQ do not effectively
address the process and operational side of
assuring safe drinking water. Rather, the GCDWQ
are primarily a table of MAC numbers, which
unfortunately help perpetuate the pervasive
misunderstanding that numbers assure safe water
rather than competence and good practices. The
earlier case studies all show to varying degrees,
with Walkerton and North Battleford at the
forefront, that the unsafe water, illness and even
deaths resulted from a failure to operate the water| 14 Commentary 323
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5 “…(standards) represent, in general, imaginary lines between good and bad; necessary for the enactment and enforcement of rules and
regulations, but nevertheless inadequate expressions of real fact” (Phelps, 1948). 
system effectively, not a failure to have more
stringent numerical criteria.
What Does Safe Drinking Water Mean?
If one looks at drinking water legislation or
guidance, there is very little written as to what is
meant by “safe drinking water.” The GCDWQ,
the Ontario Safe Drinking Water Act and the US
Safe Drinking Water Act all fail to define the term.
The WHO Drinking Water Guidelines (WHO
2004b) state: 
Safe drinking-water, as defined by the Guidelines,
does not represent any significant risk to health
over a lifetime of consumption, including different
sensitivities that may occur between life stages. 
This is a well crafted definition that accurately
describes the premise for the WHO parameter
guidelines. However, a close reading reveals why
governments are apparently so reluctant to define
safe drinking water in legislation.
Two observations are important regarding the
WHO definition. First, it indicates that safe
drinking water does not pose zero health risk, but
rather the risk is so low as to be negligible.
However, different people will have different views
about what is negligible – the assessment of the
scientists who recommend the WHO guidelines
may not align with everyone among the consuming
public. Certainly the many urban Canadians who
spend money on expensive bottled water because
of health concerns, rather than for reasons of
convenience or taste, are showing they believe
their municipal tapwater, which almost universally
meets WHO guidelines, may not be safe. 
Statistics Canada (2009) has reported that in
2007, 30 percent of Canadian households drank
mostly bottled water and about half treated their
tap water with a home water-treatment device.
Meanwhile, Dupont et al. (2010) report that
health concerns about tap water and a belief that
bottled water is safer are the most significant
factors among Canadians choosing bottled water
or home water-treatment over tapwater. 
Second, Canadians should understand that the
difference between safe and unsafe is not a sharp
line.
5 For example, driving through a red light is
probably unsafe, but driving through a green light
is not risk-free. Ultimately, the pragmatic
judgment that we individually make about safety
is that if the risk is small enough, we do not need
to worry about it – we will accept a very small risk
and treat it as effectively safe (Hrudey and
Krewski 1995). Any drinking water supply in
Canada can meet this pragmatic and functional
definition of safety with only a modest investment
in assuring competence. However, based on
inadequate competence there are still many small
drinking water supplies that would not qualify as
safe, even by that modest standard. 
Narrow Focus on Water Quality 
Guideline Numbers
Rather than recognizing and delivering what is
required to assure Canadians of a safe drinking
water supply – a serious investment in training
and operational support – there are far too many
distractions that perpetuate a misguided focus on
the wrong things. For example, the claim that
even very low-level contamination of water by a
wide array of pollutants poses a health risk to
Canadians is alarmist and non-scientific (see, for
example, Boyd 2006). 
To take a purely numbers-driven approach that
compares the maximum acceptable concentrations
for contaminants in the GCDWQ with numerical
guidelines and standards in other western
jurisdictions (ibid) may miss the point. On the
face of it, who can argue with going for the best
numbers in the world? The problem is that simply
specifying lower numbers for compliance
monitoring does not address the causes of the
many documented failures in drinking 
water safety.Commentary 323 | 15
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Bottled Water and Home Water-Treatment
Despite substantial improvements since
Walkerton, the regulation of drinking water in
Canada is guided and managed in a fragmented,
almost ad hoc, manner that leaves us vulnerable to
future water-quality failures, most likely in smaller
communities, and to the continuing commercial
exploitation of fears about water safety by highly
profitable marketers of bottled water and home
water-treatment devices (Hrudey 2008). From
1999 to 2004, per capita bottled water
consumption in Canada grew an estimated 40
percent.
6 Ironically, the growing expenditures on
bottled water in Canada come at a time when
many Canadians seem largely indifferent or
complacent about the need to invest in assuring
high-quality municipal water supplies.
The Challenge for Those Who Must Deliver Safe
Drinking Water
The GCDWQ emphasis, nationally, on water
quality numbers combined with the reality that
our provincial regulatory schemes largely place the
responsibility for delivering safe drinking water on
municipal authorities, remains a recipe for
allowing failure. Our current system means that
the level of government with the least financial
capacity – notably when it comes to medium and
smaller communities – and the lowest level of
technical resources is held accountable for the
often complex task of ensuring that water is safe 
to consume. 
If smaller communities rely on the GCDWQ as
the guide for achieving this task, they will find a
document that lists MACs for 88 different
physical and chemical parameters with 68 of these
based on health concerns, plus another 18 for
radionuclides. Currently, the GCDWQ is
comparable to specifying a destination without
providing any map or directions on how best to
get there or even knowing if you got there.
Furthermore, if water providers consult the
GCDWQ technical background documents, they
will find little help with determining how
important or relevant an individual parameter is
to the safety of their water system. Anyone
studying these documents could also be forgiven
for deciding to drink bottled water after reading
the sections describing health effects of various
parameters on experimental animals, without
realizing that most animal evidence is obtained at
massively higher dose levels, generally not even
delivered by a drinking water exposure route.
Because the route and means of exposure
matter in determining health effects, the relevance
of experimental results on animals to human
drinking water consumption has been shown to
be suspect in major cases such as chloroform
(Hrudey 2009) and bromodichloromethane
(BDCM). 
Even though the overall guidelines package is
reasonably careful to stress that microbial
pathogens pose the greatest risk to human health
from drinking water, there remains an inordinate
focus on chemical hazards. Many, if not most, of
those engaged in delivering water to the public
believe that science has proven that disinfection
by-products (DBPs), a largely inevitable
consequence of disinfecting water to prevent
waterborne disease, are certain to cause cancer
among consumers (Chowdhury and Hall 2010).
This view lacks credible scientific evidence despite
being widely held (Hrudey 2009).
Operating personnel can be forgiven for finding
it unsettling to be told that doing what must be
done to control microbial pathogens is giving
their consumers cancer. The problem is largely
one of communication. The information available
to operational personnel does little to inform
them about the level of precaution that is wisely –
in most cases
7 – built in to setting MAC values
and the often relatively low confidence that can be
placed in knowing that particular chemicals cause
serious disease via drinking water exposure. 
6 These are estimated from data provided by Pacific Institute (2007) www.worldwater.org/data.html data Table 13. 
7 In some cases (e.g., the rationale for the MAC for dichloromethane), adoption of additional uncertainty factors or very weak evidence for
cancer causation drives an extremely low MAC value that is inadequately justified in the standard-setting process.| 16 Commentary 323
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That limited confidence is not an inherent
criticism of those who do the background health
research; rather it is a reality linked to the
limitations of our means for studying extremely
low population health risks and a general lack of
effective risk communication within professional
(health and operational) communities. This is not
to say that chemical risks should not be addressed
and all reasonable efforts made to reduce these
risks in the few circumstances where they apply.
Rather, the efforts at insuring neglible health risk
from any conceivable drinking water contaminant
must not undermine the primary focus on
managing those risks that can have real and
significant public health consequences as incidents
like Walkerton and those in Appendix B demonstrate.
A Rational Way Forward
On the face of it, Canadians should be asking why
Canada appears to be out of step with the
international leaders in assuring safe drinking
water. If it is not practical to replace our current
system of downloading responsibility for safe
drinking water to the lowest level of public
authority, we at least need to provide appropriate
oversight and guidance systems. Regulatory
systems should not only hold those public
authorities accountable for the provision of safe
drinking water, but also assist them in
understanding the full nature of the challenge they
have been dealt and provide the appropriate and
effective support to help them deliver on their
responsibility. Ontario’s initiative in creating and
supporting the Walkerton Clean Water Centre
(http://www.wcwc.ca/en/) is an excellent example
of what is needed. Likewise, the Canadian
Municipal Water Consortium of the Canadian
Water Network (http://www.cwn-
rce.ca/research/consortium/municipal-water-
management/) which seeks to facilitate municipal
access to and use of Canada’s considerable water
research capabilities, is another promising example
of promoting the way forward.
Setting and Understanding Priorities
in Drinking Water Safety
Those engaged in the process of setting MACs for
drinking-water-quality parameters see the process
largely as one of risk assessment – identifying the
hazard, describing the hazard in terms of its
toxicological properties to animals and humans,
quantifying the relationship between potential
drinking water exposure and predicted health
outcome and, finally, selecting a deemed
acceptable level of risk via drinking water exposure
that determines the MAC value. While it is true
that setting MAC values relies upon this kind of
risk assessment, the process is an act of risk
management because it inherently involves a
number of judgment choices that are contingent
upon a variety of assumptions. 
There is nothing inherently wrong with this
process, and in general it is simply our best way of
coping with incomplete knowledge in a
precautionary way that seeks to protect public
health. What is wrong is that MAC values often
implicitly convey a message that a failure to satisfy
these values will result in a real and unacceptable
effect. Likely harm from drinking water exposure,
based on experiential evidence, is only a valid
expectation for the relatively short list of drinking
water parameters reviewed in Appendix C 
(WHO 2007). 
Most of the long list of MAC values are set in a
precautionary manner to prevent the possibility,
not the inevitability, that these parameters will
represent any kind of health risk via drinking
water exposure. Indeed, in most cases MAC values
are irrelevant for routine risk management because
the parameters are generally not found in drinking
water at levels that represent any possible health
risk. Understanding the distinction between
“remote possibility” and “real inevitability” needs
to be conveyed clearly and effectively to those who
must deliver safe drinking water so that they are
not distracted from rigorously controlling the
contaminants that we know pose a serious human
health risk. Commentary 323 | 17
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The ever-growing list of MAC values based on
largely precautionary grounds must be considered
but cannot be allowed to siphon resources or
attention away from those health risks that must
be addressed. 
The Canadian Municipal Consortium has
proposed the following risk management priorities
for drinking water (Douglas et al. 2010, Hrudey
et al. 2010), using a hierarchy that applies to
providing safe drinking water and that can be
adapted to fit local needs. 
1. Highly certain and pervasive risks require action for
any water system – microbial pathogens are the best
example of this type of risk as they are known to
cause human disease via drinking water exposure.
Because of their fecal origin, they present a pervasive
risk to all surface water systems, many groundwater
sources and to all distribution systems.
2. Reasonably certain but less pervasive risks (appearing
in some drinking water systems) should be identified
and addressed as necessary – some parameters have
been shown to cause human illness (or adverse
effect) via drinking water exposure at some time,
somewhere in the world (e.g., arsenic, fluoride,
selenium, nitrates and lead [WHO 2007]). These
are site-specific (e.g., local geology, distribution
system materials or other local factors) and only
apply to some drinking waters. 
3. Common but comparatively uncertain risks
(produced in water treatment) require a rational
precautionary response – various parameters (e.g.,
DBPs, aluminum, water treatment chemicals)
warrant scrutiny because they are produced or
added in the water treatment process, are very
common, making exposure pervasive, and may be
amenable to reduction through process refinements.
4. Site-specific contaminants with noteworthy toxic
potential require localized plans commensurate with
locally assessed risk – various parameters (e.g.,
pesticides, cyanobacterial toxins) with toxic
potential relevant to drinking water exposure and
that can be found in water need to be assessed to
determine site-specific relevance.
5. Emerging contaminants – these are parameters that
require research to characterize the nature of the
problem they may pose. Advances in analytical
chemistry guarantee that many hitherto undetected
contaminants will be identified in drinking water
and these require research to characterize their
nature to determine if they pose a credible
drinking water health problem versus a conceivable
but highly unlikely problem. Because this
distinction is too often not understood, the latter
commonly becomes a source of unwarranted
concern. Once research has adequately characterized
the risks relative to other sources of human
exposure, emerging contaminants may be
appropriately classified. In the meantime, treatment
barriers should not be altered unless there is
reasonable certainty that such alterations will not
simply create other, as yet uncharacterized, risks.
The challenge is to get drinking water regulators
to recognize and adopt the logic behind this risk
characterization hierarchy. Otherwise, the
drinking water providers will continue to be
largely driven by the letter of their regulatory
approval and may not have any discretion to
prioritize actions relative to these different risks.
At the very least, there needs to be acceptance and
application of the reality that all risks to drinking
water safety are not equal and that drinking water
treatment strategies must address the important
risks before limited resources are substantially
diverted to dealing with the hypothetical issues. 
Competence – Know Your System
The bottom line for assuring safe drinking water
for Canadians is ensuring that those engaged in
the process of delivering and regulating drinking
water are knowledgeable, competent and
committed. Whether water systems are
municipally, regionally or privately owned is not
the critical test; it is whether the entity is fully
competent and able to discharge the heavy
responsibility that continuously providing high-
quality, safe drinking water demands. This is
essential and there are no easy-fix alternatives.
Simply throwing money at a problem without
having the money guided by those who
understand what is required will achieve little, or
may even be counter-productive, as shown by the
monumental misunderstanding and misguided
investment in the Kashechewan evacuation.| 18 Commentary 323
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The first step is to recognize that providing safe
drinking water is a knowledge-based activity. This
activity cannot be downloaded to the same level of
municipal priority as garbage collection and snow
removal. Those assigned to provide drinking water
have to be afforded the training, intellectual
support and compensation that is commensurate
with taking responsibility through their actions or
inactions for the health of an entire community. 
Think about whether you would be willing to
travel in a plane being flown by a pilot who is paid
a minimal wage, received limited training and had
no or minimal technical or functional support to
fly safely. Yet many communities in Canada today,
over 10 years since the Walkerton disaster, employ
water operators with the lowest level of training
and financial compensation that the community
can get away with. 
Requiring certification of operators, which has
been a common regulatory response in Canada,
particularly over the past decade, still does not
assure that the operator has been equipped with
the tools to fully understand her or his own
system, the site – and system-specific contaminant
challenges it faces and the capabilities and
limitations of the water safety barriers in place to
deal with these challenges. 
Even a well-trained and highly committed
operator is likely to encounter circumstances that
are unfamiliar and may signal trouble. Effective
support systems are needed to allow operators to
call for help when faced with a problem they do
not understand or cannot resolve. The circuit-
rider system mentioned in the discussion of the
Expert Panel on Safe Drinking Water for First
Nations is an excellent example of such a support
mechanism, but such programs are generally
under-resourced compared with capital funding or
administrative bureaucracy. There is no equivalent
system in place for small or remote non-First
Nations communities except for a few exceptional
pockets of provincial enlightenment (e.g., the
Walkerton Clean Water Centre) where support for
assuring safe water is regarded as being at least as
important as prosecuting regulatory offences.
Training programs also need to make greater use
of experience in dealing with failure. Case studies
of health outbreaks and their causes are an
obvious source for such training material.
Fortunately, most operators will not experience an
outright failure, but they can surely benefit from
reviewing the negative experience of others as well
as the more common close calls. At present, there
is no means for gathering such experiences and
incorporating them into training materials. 
International water utility operators who are
converts to the water safety plan approach can
verify that they previously thought they were
doing everything right. It was only through the
most rigorous and consistent commitment to
being self-critical that some well-established
entities discovered system vulnerabilities that they
never would have recognized under a business-as-
usual approach (Walker 2010, Breach 2011).
How to Get There From Here – A Call
for Leadership!
The water safety plan approach that is being
implemented around the world offers Canada a
valuable model and a timely opportunity to place
a greater emphasis on drinking water providers
knowing their own water systems much better,
regardless of system size. Currently, Canada
appears to be a “water safety plan-free zone”
because we have had little evident institutional
interest in or demonstrated uptake of this concept.
Perhaps Ontario’s new accreditation system with a
requirement for developing an operational plan
comes closest, but its complexity may prevent
smaller water providers from grasping the key
elements of understanding their own system. In
any case, we should ask: Which jurisdiction in
Canada can argue credibly against fully
implementing a system based on operational
competence and water safety plans? 
Municipalities are not going to volunteer to
adopt a new approach in addition to their current
responsibilities. Many are already stretched in
their capacity to meet regulatory requirements, soCommentary 323 | 19
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
a move toward a water safety plan approach must
be phased in with some sensible easing of the total
regulatory burden. Ontario, which argues that it
already has such a system in place, should be
willing to demonstrate how well its system meets
the emerging international norms for assuring safe
drinking water, and promote a national effort to
make water safety plans a standard approach
across Canada.
Canadians have taken pride in our history of
embracing evolution rather than revolution.
Reforming and revitalizing our system for
managing safe drinking water presents a unique
opportunity to demonstrate that we can logically
and rationally evolve to a better system. We need
some modest institutional leadership to show a
meaningful commitment to recognizing drinking
water provision as a knowledge-based activity
worthy of appropriate investment. 
Canada has many of the necessary pieces, with
initiatives such as the Canadian Municipal
Consortium and the Walkerton Clean Water
Centre providing cause for optimism, but we need
to have more explicit leadership towards the water
safety plan approach from our drinking water
regulators than is currently apparent. The one
Canadian institution that could move a water
safety plan – “know your own system” – approach
forward nationally is the Committee on Drinking
Water (CDW). But this can happen only if CDW
seeks and accepts a mandate broader than its
current primary focus on numerical water quality
criteria, something that its provincial members
must endorse. If CDW cannot or will not move
explicitly to a water safety plan approach, then
individual provinces will need to pursue this
eminently sensible approach on their own. We can
deliver safer water anywhere in Canada – we only
need to exercise the will to do so.C.D. Howe Institute
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Appendix A: Microbial Risks in 
Developing Countries
Unfortunately, the public health triumph of
delivering safe water achieved in the
industrialized, developed countries has not been
implemented worldwide. While some may believe
that this depressing reality has little relevance to
drinking water safety in Canada, the continuing
causation of illness and death worldwide from
contaminated drinking water provides a stark and
highly relevant reminder that drinking water
which is not managed and treated will cause
microbial illness anywhere. We are only as far
removed from this global threat to drinking water
safety in Canada as competent water and
sanitation practices will allow us to be.
Even now diarrhoeal disease alone is estimated
to be responsible for approximately 2 million
deaths every year, with most of those attributable
to inadequate water supply, sanitation and hygiene,
mainly among children in developing countries
(WHO, 2004a). This represents approximately 4
percent of total deaths and 5 percent of health loss
to disability worldwide. These problems with
disease in the developing world are generally
known, but their depressing magnitude and
pervasive cause that occurs wherever humans reside
(human and animal pathogens) may not be fully
appreciated in the comfort zone of urban Canada. Commentary 323 | 21
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treatment by filtration only
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about how the outbreak
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the following 2 years
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water intake not recognized
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￿ poor maintenance of water
storage allowed fecal
contamination
￿ water quality management
not based on good
knowledge of system
￿ no treatment barrier in
place
Table B1 Summary of Fatal Drinking Water Outbreaks in Affluent Countries since 1983 
(Hrudey & Hrudey 2004)C.D. Howe Institute
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vulnerability of shallow well
when first installed 
in 1978
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installation
￿ regulator failed to implement
policy requiring continuous
chlorine residual monitors on
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contaminated water could kill
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￿ failure to recognize that
extreme weather and flooding
could cause water
contamination
￿ failure to maintain chlorine
residuals
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￿ monitoring did not detect this
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￿ distribution of undisinfected
water invited health problems
￿ poor maintenance of surface
water storage allowed
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Appendix C: Chemical Risks 
Current popular focus on drinking water over the
past few decades has shifted to chemical
contamination despite the compelling death toll
noted above. The popular focus is commonly
directed to exotic trace contaminants and
pesticides which pose a negligible risk to human
health from drinking water exposure. Perhaps less
well known are some globally recognized chemical
causes of waterborne disease or health effects.
These details are outlined below.
The four chemicals described in the following
are the main chemical contaminants identified by
the World Health Organization in a review aimed
at setting risk management priorities for drinking
water (WHO 2007). These four chemical
contaminants stand in stark contrast to the 88
parameters listed in the Guidelines for Canadian
Drinking Water Quality (GCDWQ). We need to
understand why there is such a large difference
between the small number of contaminants that
are known to have caused human health effects
and represent a clear risk via drinking water
exposure wherever these mostly natural
contaminants occur in sufficient concentration
versus the total much larger number of chemical
parameters listed in the GCDWQ.
Drinking water guidelines are essential to serve
as a benchmark for judging water quality risks for
chemicals that may be found in water, but the
premise that all of these chemicals represent a
serious health risk to humans via drinking water
exposure lacks credible supporting evidence.
Consequently, monitoring regularly for all of the
parameters is generally an unjustified investment
and simply monitoring this list rather than
focusing on assuring effective operation of
treatment processes will not provide a preventive
approach for assuring safe water. Such assurance
requires effective process monitoring (i.e.
monitoring parameters which provide an
understanding of process performance) but
monitoring strictly for treated water compliance
with GCDWQ parameters does not assure that
level of understanding for operations. Obviously
consumers will need to know how any water
supply satisfies these quality criteria and having a
baseline of quality data is important for
comparison purposes.
Arsenic
Arsenic is certainly the most common and serious
agent of waterborne illness caused by strictly
chemical contamination. Arsenic is the 20th most
abundant element in the earth’s crust and it is
found to some degree in almost all water sources.
Based on relatively valid epidemiologic evidence,
arsenic is believed to cause various forms of
cancer, particularly skin cancer, if ingested via
drinking water at high enough levels over
sufficient years of exposure. Consequently,
drinking water standards for arsenic have been
lowered over the past decade, generally to a
maximum acceptable concentration (MAC) for
daily consumption over a lifetime of less than 0.01
mg/L (WHO 2010a). 
Countries with arsenic concentrations found in
groundwater supplies that substantially exceed the
MAC include Argentina, Bangladesh, Chile,
China (Taiwan), India, Mexico, Thailand and
parts of the United States. Some localized high
arsenic groundwaters have been found in Canada,
mostly in rocky areas of Newfoundland and Nova
Scotia. Some of the most serious cases of high
arsenic exposure have occurred in Bangladesh
where aid programs had installed tube wells to
provide drinking water that is more
microbiologically safe than surface waters in this
flood-prone country. Unfortunately, the
groundwater contains high natural arsenic. An
estimated 35 to 77 million residents of
Bangladesh are at risk of consuming arsenic-
contaminated drinking water with the
corresponding resultant increased risk of cancer. 
Fluoride
Fluoride is another naturally occurring substance
found in drinking water. Low levels of fluoride in
drinking water (< 1 - 2 mg/L) have been found to
provide strengthening of dental enamel and
reduction of tooth decay. Slightly higher levels of
fluoride exposure can cause dental fluorosis whichC.D. Howe Institute
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is manifested by staining and pitting of dental
enamel, but ingestion of fluoride above the age of
six will not cause dental fluorosis (WHO 2010b).
At even higher levels of chronic (long term)
fluoride exposure, skeletal fluorosis is possible
leading to stiffness, joint pain and in extreme
cases, changes in bone structure. Acute (short
term) high level fluoride poisoning causes
immediate responses such as abdominal pain,
excessive saliva, nausea, vomiting, seizure and
muscle spasms.
Excess fluoride exposure in drinking water
typically only occurs in groundwaters, commonly
in foothills to high mountains or in geological
deposits associated with marine areas. Fluoride –
impacted geological regions are known in the
Middle East, Africa, Asia and the Americas. In the
case of fluoride in drinking water, there is a
relatively narrow range between the well-
documented beneficial effects of fluoridating
drinking water on dental health and negative
effects of excessive natural fluoride exposure
leading to dental fluorosis. 
Lead
Lead is a metal contaminant with well-documented
adverse health effects in humans (WHO 2010c).
The most vulnerable group for lead
contamination are young children and workers
exposed to lead sources. Lead exposure via
drinking water is generally small, particularly in
hard or alkaline water. Lead exposures from
contaminated soil, lead-based paint, air emissions
and lead contaminated food are generally much
higher than drinking water exposures to lead. 
The main source of lead contamination of
drinking water is from lead pipes used in water
distribution. Historically lead was the preferred
metal for service lines and in alloys for  plumbing
fixtures. For the past several decades installation of
lead pipes has been discontinued in developed
countries, but local circumstances differ regarding
the removal of lead service lines. Drinking water
has also been contaminated by lead-containing
solder, which has also now been generally
discontinued for new plumbing fixtures and local
circumstances will dictate the degree of exposure
to legacy fixtures.
Nitrates and Nitrites
Nitrate (and nitrite) in drinking water can cause
methaemoglobinaemia, a decreased ability of
blood to carry essential oxygen to body organs
(WHO 2010d). Ingested nitrate is converted to
nitrite in the digestive system. Nitrite can bind to
haemoglobin in the blood more strongly than
oxygen, thereby reducing oxygen-carrying
capacity. Methaemoglobinaemia mainly poses a
risk to bottle fed infants, mostly below 3 months
of age. The condition has been called “blue baby
syndrome” because those infants affected can
show a blue tinge around the mouth, hands and
feet. It can lead to vomiting and diarrhea with
serious cases leading to lost consciousness, seizures
and even death. 
Risk of methaemoglobinaemia is usually limited
to groundwater, most commonly rural water
supplies affected by agricultural nitrogen
pollution. Water containing less than 50 mg/L of
nitrate (as NO3) poses no risk of this disease.Commentary 323 | 25
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